GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e , I n c o r p o r a t e d Presents: __ __ 999999999 444 _____ ____ _| |__| |_ 9999 9999 44 44 // | \ |_ __ _| 999 999 44 44 || ____ | || | | | | | 9999 9999 44444444444 || || \ / | || | _| |__| |_ 9999999999 44 \\___// \/\/ |____/ |_ __ _| 999 44 |__| |__| 999 44 999 4444 "Evaluating Some Premises of Hill's Argument in 'Self-Regarding Suicide'" by Otis ----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #94 ----- ----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 ----- Evaluating Some Premises of Hill's Argument in "Self-Regarding Suicide" Sketching arguments for or against specific moral practices typically proves a difficult affair, given, if conclusions are sought in the manner of logical deductions, the need to assert premises. These premises themselves often take the form of unjustified presumptions, taken as "obvious" or "self-evident" when in fact they are not. If not, then it often occurs that the justifications upon which these premises are based are themselves problematic, unjustified, or even unjustifiable. Once the truth of the premises is questioned, the utility of the logical implication from them to the conclusions in establishing truth will also come under suspicion. In "Self-Regarding Suicide: A Modified Kantian View," Thomas E. Hill attempts to construct an argument against the practice of suicide using Kantian claims as premises. Yet, upon reflection, it is not at all certain that his premises are true and would imply the conclusion. In establishing the truth of a conditional statement, two tests must be performed: the first checks the soundness of the implication on logical grounds, demonstrating that if the premises were true, the conclusion would also be true, thus creating a theoretically true conditional statement; the second test verifies the empirical truth of the premises, creating a conditional statement that is true not merely theoretically but empirically. Thus, my project herein is to assail the empirical truth of the premises, not the logical truth of the argument itself, whereby I hope to block the application of the implication to the world understood empirically. However, this distinction in focus should not lead one to assume that I have accepted the logical merits of the argument. Rather, I have simply chosen to attack the premises because of their potential application in manifold arguments; essentially, my aim herein is to assail the foundations of Kantian ethical argument through an investigation of two of Hill's premises in "Self-Regarding Suicide: A Modified Kantian View." Hill maintains as critical to demonstrating the moral wrongness of suicide the following Kantian position: "An essential feature of our humanity is that we are rational agents with autonomy of the will." Curzer already observes the problematic nature of the use of the term "essence" in his brief response to this premise, and, I see no need to attack the notion of essence here, though again this should not be interpreted as tacit acceptance. Allowing that our "humanity" can have any "essential" features, why should the fact that "we are rational agents with autonomy of the will" be one of them? Why should reason enter essentially into the determination of a human being? If a man happens to lose his ability to reason through some accident, does he cease thereby to be a human being? If he does, this event is no mere metaphysical distinction, no simple nomenclatorial change. He, upon forfeiture of his humanity, further forfeits everything to which he possessed a claim by means of that humanity. For example, if he ceased to be human, he would as a consequence lose the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the eyes of American law, for such rights are commonly denied non-humans such as animals. Yet, we do not allow the unpunished killing of mental patients who appear to have lost a capacity for reasoning; thus, we still allow them the right to life, though we place restrictions on other rights to protect them and others from them, and in this way we reaffirm their humanity in spite of their deficiencies. I have no qualms with considering reason to be the mark of a normal human being and to treat those without reason as deficient human beings, so long as those without reason remain human beings, albeit deficient ones. To employ another instance, consider newborn human children, whose ability to reason is significantly less than that of many advanced primates. At this point, should they not be considered human, since they lack the "essential" component of reason? But if they are not human, why should we provide them with the same sorts of rights that we provide adult humans under the aegis of "human rights"? Therefore, I do not see why being "rational" should be or is an "essential" feature of humanity, though I of course leave open the possibility that it could be. I am merely insisting that it is not self-evident or grounded on the empirical attitudes of society that reasoning should be used to distinguish human beings from non-human beings. Hill also holds that human beings are "agents with autonomy of the will." The notions of "agency" and "autonomy of the will" presuppose that we are free in a meaningful sense of that rather difficult word. However, in a deterministic universe, such as that envisioned by the Stoics, no such "agency" or "autonomy" would be possible, unless mental acts are being considered. This vision of the universe, though it might lead to complacency or the inability to hold others responsible for malicious actions, might nevertheless obtain. Sure, we conceive of ourselves as making choices all the time, but might we not be deluded as to that freedom by something akin to the Cartesian demon? Perhaps every "choice" we make, we were obliged or "destined" to make by something beyond ourselves. Such a view is not as radical as it might at first appear. It is common to hear, especially in religious discourse, that certain things were "meant to be" or that a tragic loss was part of a "divine plan." In traditional Christian doctrine, God, as omniscient, knows both the past and the future; thus, in some sense, we are not free to choose our future, since the future is already determined in the mind of God. Furthermore, legal discourse often supports a deterministic account of an event over a more mainstream intentionalist account; such accounts occur in insanity defenses as well as when courts use provocation as a mitigating factor in homicides. If "autonomy of the will" were an essential feature of humanity, then if at any moment we ceased to be autonomous, we would no longer be human; therefore, if we commit an action that was beyond our control not to commit (evidencing a lack of autonomy, however temporary), we cannot be held legally responsible for that action, since human law seemingly does not apply to non-humans. Therefore, I can neither confirm nor repudiate the essentialist claim that Hill/Kant makes, since it remains possible despite my skepticism, though, because of that very skepticism, I cannot endorse it as unjustified empirical truth. Before deducing the moral wrongness of suicide from Kantian principles, Hill states the following Kantian premise: A fundamental moral principle, one to which any rational being with autonomy would commit himself, is: always act so that you treat humanity (that is, autonomy and rationality) never simply as a means, but always as an end in itself (that is, as something with "unconditional and incomparable worth"). (1) I do not believe that it is true that any "rational being with autonomy" would place humanity above all else; I think that rational, autonomous people might choose, after deliberation made freely, to forfeit reason and autonomy in return for an infinite amount of pleasurable sensation. Furthermore, it seems people commonly use their humanity as a means to obtain other things; for example, the Dedclaration of Independence allows Americans to use their humanity to garner certain "inalienable rights." Oppressed groups, particularly in our country, have appealed to their humanity to gain possession of other goods, such as freedom and suffrage. Additionally, it must be asked if rationality and autonomy are worthwhile in themselves. Why would someone want reason, if not that it might allow him to enjoy what Mill calls the "higher pleasures" of contemplation and knowledge? Perhaps only the most obstinate of philosophers would want reason for its own sake and not for the pleasures that can be gained by it. What is the value of being free if not to be free to pursue happiness? I would think most rational people would assent to being under the dominion of another rather than retain absolute freedom. In fact, Hobbes thinks that if everyone lived in complete freedom from one another, their lives would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (2). In order to be able to enjoy a life free from constant worry about the actions of others, it was found necessary, according to Hobbes and the "social contract" philosophers, for man to give up a portion of his freedom to act as he will to a sovereign body in exchange for protection against others. Thus, the ability to enjoy a secure existence, which makes possible the sustained experience of pleasure, seems to be more valuable than freedom, since it appears evident that most rational beings would exchange absolute freedom for a more limited but secure one. Thus, it is dubious as to whether the above- cited principle is indeed "fundamental" in any meaningful sense of that term or that anyone would "commit" himself to following it. I do not deny that a rational being may choose to act on that principle when so doing would benefit him, but I doubt that anyone would "commit" himself to following that principle despite the greater appeal of pleasure. Herein I have tried merely to cast doubt on a pair of Kantian principles that Thomas E. Hill uses to demonstrate the moral wrongness of suicide. I do not assert that he, and Kant for that matter, might not be right, but rather the weaker claim that they could very well be wrong and need to produce greater empirical support to garner my philosophical assent. ----- -=[Footnotes]=- 1. For the purposes of the argument, Hill presupposes that we are free physically. 2. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Trans. A.T.A.B., Amsterdam, 1667. 89. ----------------------------------------------------------- GwDweb: http://www.GREENY.org/ GwD Publications: http://gwd.mit.edu/ ftp://ftp.GREENY.org/gwd/ GwD BBSes: C.H.A.O.S. - http://chaos.GREENY.org/ Snake's Den - http://www.snakeden.org/ E-Mail: gwd@GREENY.org * GwD, Inc. - P.O. Box 16038 - Lubbock, Texas 79490 * -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Don't throw in the towel cuz your life ain't shit, no take the towel and hang yourself with it." - Bloodhound Gang, "Lift Your Head Up High and Blow Your Brains Out" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -+- F Y M -+- GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\ copyright (c) MM Otis/GwD Publications :SHIT YOUR PANTS: copyright (c) MM GwD, Inc. : GwD : All rights reserved \---------------/ GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD94